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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF FEDERAL
CrnzENSHIP - DrscRIMINATORY TAX ON OuT-OF-STATE BANK DEPOSITS
- COLGATE v. HARVEY OvERRULED - A Kentucky statute 1 imposed on its
citizens an annual ad valorem tax on their bank deposits outside the state at the
rate of fifty cents per $ I oo and at the same time imposed on their bank deposits
within the state a similar tax at the rate of ten cents per $ I oo. Decedent, a resident and citizen of Kentucky, died in 1929. On several prior tax assessment dates,
he had large funds on deposit in New York banks which he failed to report for
taxation purposes. The state brought suit against the executor to recover the
tax, interest, and penalties. The Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled the
executor's contentions that the classification was void under the due, process
or equal protection clauses and that it violated the privileges or immunities of
national citizenship.2 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
that the classification was reasonable due to the difficulty and expense of collecting the tax on out-of-state deposits and that no privilege or immunity of
national citizenship was violated. Colgate v. Harvey 8 was specifically overruled, it being held that the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business,
or calling, such as deposit of money in banks, was not a privilege of national
citizenship. Justices Roberts and McReynolds dissented. Madden v. Kentucky,
(U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 406.
The eighty words contained in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are among the most significant ever written in American history.4 Composed in a post-helium period of idealism, retribution, and bitter party battles,
these words had a meaning in 1868 far different from that ascribed to them
today. 5 The main purpose of the framers was to give Congress the power to
enforce all civil liberties, especially those enumerated in th~ first eight amendments. 6 Their basic theory ran as follows: (I) national citizenship was synonyKy. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1930), §§ 4019, 4019a-1, 4019a-10.
Commonwealth v. Madden's Exr., 265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W. (2d) 561 (1936),
noted in 26 KY. L. REV. 71 (1937) and on another point in 31 ILL. L. REV. 825
(1937); Madden's Exr. v. Commonwealth, 277 Ky. 343, 126 S. W. (2d) 463
(1939).
8 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935), noted in 34 M1cH. L. REv. 1034
(1936).
4 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
5 The second, third, and fourth sections of the amendment were passed mainly
to punish the South. One of the most potent factors leading to the adoption of the
amendment as a whole was the desire of the Republican Party to firmly establish and
maintain control of the government by centralizing the powers in the first section in
the federal government. CoLLINs, THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES
7-20 (1912).
6 Rep. Bingham of Ohio, the recognized author of the first section, and other
proponents of the amendment constantly reiterated this purpose in the congressional
debates. Bingham, in CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., part 2, pp. 1090 ff. (1866);
1

2
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mous with state citizenship; 1 ( 2) the states had always been bound to respect
the privileges of national citizenship, among which were the fundamental rights
of life, liberty, and property; 8 (3) the states through legislation often had
interfered with these privileges; 9 (4) the federal government had no effective
power to remedy such violations; (5) therefore, the Constitution must be
amended to give it this power. This, then, was the reasoning behind the insertion
of the privileges and immunities clause.10 The due process clause was inserted
to supplement the privileges and immunities clause with procedural safeguards
and to prevent any possible loophole for the states because of doubts as to the
exact status of the negro.11 But these well-laid plans floundered on the rocks of
judicial construction in the Slaughterhouse Cases. 12 A slim majority, indulging
in a "parade of the imaginary horribles" that would follow the granting of so
much power to the federal government,13 drew a sharp distinction between fedHoward, ibid., part 3, pp. 2765-2766. See also FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT 55-97 (1908); Boudin, "Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 19 at 34-35 and 68-71, especially
note 14 on p. 35 (1938).
1 Graham, "The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment," 47 YALE
L. J. 371 at 387 (1938). Rep. Bingham also interpreted those privileges and immunities to which "citizens of each state" were entitled under the comity clause of
article 4, section two, to be the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States." Thus the clause to him read: "Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens (of the United States) in the several states."
Ibid., 400. This is one possible view of the dictum of Justice Washington in Car.field
v. Coryell, (C. C. Pa. 1823) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 6 F. Cas. 546, No. 3,230. However,
this view has not been followed; the clause is interpreted to protect the citizen of
another state from discriminatory denial of "fundamental" rights which a state grants
to its own citizens, but it does not prevent the state taking away any "fundamental"
rights from its own citizens. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869). See also
McGovney, "Privileges or Immunities Clause--Fourteenth Amendment," 4 lowA L.
BuLL. 219 at 229 (1918).
8
This view was also derived from Justice Washington's dictum in Car.field v.
Coryell, (C. C. Pa. 1823) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 6 F. Cas. 546, No. 3,230.
°Frequent reference was made in Congressional debates to the discriminatory
legislation passed by the southern states against the negroes-the so-called "black
laws." See FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 96 (1908).
10 The fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, it should be noted, empowered
Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the limitations set forth in the first section.
11 The framers were not sure that the free negroes would be considered citizens,
and inasmuch as Bingham thought of the due process clause and the comity clause in
article 4, section two, as guaranteeing the same rights, one applying to "persons" and
the other to "citizens," he thought he was giving double protection to them by using
both these words in the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham, "The 'Conspiracy Theory'
of the Fourteenth Amendment," 47 YALE L. J. 371 at 400 (1938).
12
16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 (1873).
111 This fear of extending national judicial and congressional power over states to
an unknown degree has been expressed in many subsequent cases. Thus, see discussion
of Justice Stone in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496
at 520, note 1, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). But this argument has little if any weight in
view of the fact that the identical extension of judicial power has taken place under the
due process clause.
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eral and state citizenship and held that the privileges and immunities clause
protected only those rights peculiar to citizens of the United States-those
interests "growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the national
government, created by the Constitution and federal laws." 14 A militant minority asserted the "fundamental" rights doctrine of the framers, but to no avail.
In case after case the Court adhered to its emasculating interpretation of the
clause, methodically striking down all attempts to incorporate therein the Bill
of Rights.15 The result was to make the clause an honorable but useless vestige
and a redundant protection. Under the prevailing interpretation, one must
(I) prove national citizenship, which excludes corporations,16 and ( 2) show
violation of the privileges and immunities clause by proving an invasion of a
right accruing to the individual, as a national citizen, by a direct provision or by
implication from some other part of the Constitution or from a federal statute.17
It is this second requirement that makes the clause superfluous, for if a violation
of some other section or law must be shown, enough in itself to invalidate the
state legislation, what advantage is there in pointing out that there has also
been a violation of the privileges and immunities clause? 18 The clause would
14 Justice Stone, dissenting, in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 at 444, 56 S.
Ct. 252 (1935). That such a distinction between national and state citizenship was
not intended by the framers is shown by the speeches on the floor of Congress after the
Slaughterhouse Cases. Senator Howe of Wisconsin stated that if the privileges and
immunities clause only protec~ed the rights of citizens of the United States, then it
was the idlest piece df verbiage that could possibly be constructed. CoNG. REc. 43d
Cong. 1st sess., pt. 5, pp. 4147-4152 (1874), quoted in FLACK, THE ADOPT.ION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 268-269 (1908).
15
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, II6 U. S. 252,
6 S. Ct. 580 (1886); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 12 S. Ct. 693 (1892);
Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908). All the cases that have
ever arisen under the privileges and immunities clause are to be found in Justice Stone's
dissent in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 at 445, note 2, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935),
and in his opinion in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.
496 at 520, note 1, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
16
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 27 S. Ct. 384 (1907);
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 19 S. Ct. 281 (1899).
17 Presser v. Illinois, u6 U.S. 252 at 266, 6 S. Ct. 580 (1886); Cox v. Texas,
202 U.S. 446 at 451, 26 S. Ct. 671 (1906).
18 The result has been that the privileges and immunities clause is relied on when
counsel cannot point out some other constitutional guaranty or federal law that has
been violated; this has caused an almost unbroken line of decisions upholding the state
statutes. Thus the courts have had to point out that it is not a privilege of a citizen
of the United States to buy junk without making inquiries as to its antecedents, Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 33 S. Ct. 27 (1912); use the American flag on a
beer bottle label, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 at 42, 27 S. Ct. 419 (1907); to
be hanged instead of electrocuted when one is sentenced to capital punishment, In re
Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, IO S. Ct. 930 (1890); play baseball on Sunday with an
admission charge, State v. Hogreiver, 152 Ind. 652, 53 N. E. 921 (1899); be free of
a miscegenation statute in choosing one's spouse, Ex parte Kinney, (C. C. Va. 1879)
14 F. Cas. 602, No. 7,825; be immune from a state statute abolishing Greek letter
fraternities in a state university, Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U. S. 589, 35 S. Ct.
720 (1915).
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have had real substance, much like the due process clause has today, had the
framers' intention been followed; then a violation could have been shown by
proving that the state law abridges some right that the Court had construed to
be a «fundamental" privilege or immunity. Furthermore, if a violation of some
other federal law or constitutional guaranty must be shown, the supremacy
clause of the Constitution 19 in conjunction with such law or guaranty gives
broader protection than the privileges and immunities clause, for it applies to all
persons, thus avoiding the necessity of proving national citizenship and giving
protection to corporations. Thus did the privileges and immunities clause lie
dormant for sixty-two years. In the meantime, the Court found reason to
abandon its early conservative position in the Slaughterhouse Cases and in the
interests of private property rights to take a greatly enlarged view of its supervisory powers over state legislation; but it seized upon the due process clause to
accomplish this and, in so doing, it did all and more than the framers meant
to do with the privileges and immunities clause. 20 Then suddenly, in 1935, the
latter clause was dusted off and applied in a surprising fashion in Colgate v.
Harvey 21 to hold unconstitutional a Vermont statute imposing a discriminatory
tax on loans made outside the state. The precise nature of this decision has never
quite been understood. Some have thought it represented a resurrection of the
original "fundamental" rights doctrine of the framers and that it meant that
no discrimination, however reasonable, may be made against loans in other
states, on the ground that the business of making loans is a fundamental privilege of national citizenship. 22 Or perhaps the Court meant only that unreasonable
discriminatory taxation was prohibited, in which case the discussion under the
privileges and immunities clause would become so much verbiage, since the equal
protection clause gives even more relief. 23 Others have emphasized the majority's
discussion of the concept of national unity and solidarity and claim that the
Court only meant to revive "fundamental" rights "inherent in the citizens of
a national government rather than ••• those which belong of right to citizens of
all free governments." 24 The fog surrounding this clause was not dispelled by
Art. 6, § 2.
For an excellent discussion of this growth of the due process clause, see
Borchard, "The Supreme Court and Private Rights," 47 YALE L. J. 1051 (1938).
See also 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 490 (1938).
2
i 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).
22
Howard, "The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate
v. Harvey," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 262 (1939); II IND. L. J. 390 (1936).
28
This interpretation is given credence by the discussion of Justice Stone in the
dissent to the case and also by a later reference to the case in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297
U.S. 431 at 437, 56 S. Ct. 532 (1936). Noteworthy also is the fact that the majority
relied heavily on, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 35 (1868), where, prior to
the Fourteenth Amendment, the privilege of passing freely from state to state to
approach the national capital was upheld. As Justice Stone pointed out, Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 at 443-444, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935), such privilege would be
protected today under the commerce clause, thus making the privileges and immunities
protection superfluous.
24
49 HARV. L. REv. 935 at 939 (1936). See also 34 MICH. L. REv. 1034
19

20

(1939).
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Justice Robert's opinion in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization/5
where he asserted that the right to assemble to discuss the National Labor Relations Act was a privilege of national citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution;
just whence this privilege was derived was not stated, unless it be either a deeply
veiled iimplication or a step back to the "fundamental" rights theory in an
attempt to narrow the due process clause. 26 As Justice Stone pointed out, the due
process clause alone was enough to dispose of the case, and in view of the
peculiar split of the Court, the privileges and immunities discussion can hardly
be said to be an authoritative pronouncement. In light of this background, the
principal case assumes its importance. In overruling Colgate v. Harvey, it has
set at rest any fears that might have materialized from that case; the states are
free once again to levy reasonable discriminatory taxes on out-of-state loans or
bank deposits with only the equal protection and due process clauses to hurdle.
More important, the principal case has, for all practical purposes, stored away
the privileges and immunities clause on the historical shelf once more. To set
aside a state statute, one must point to an abridgment of the Federal Constitution or laws and, having done that, the privileges and immunities clause
pales into insignificance; the core of the clause has been transferred to the due
process clause, which has expanded far beyond the size the privileges and immunities clause could ever have attained and which has recently taken over almost
verbatim the "fundamental" rights doctrine in the field of civil liberties. 27
However unsound historically the present situation may be, it is perhaps better
to continue the prevailing interpretations of these two clauses, limiting or expanding the flexible due process clause to meet the changing mores. The only
alternative would be to upset the concepts developed slowly over nearly threequarters of a century and to start out anew to remake the two clauses along
whatever lines the Court happened to think proper.
C. Eugene Gressman

26 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939), commented on in 38 M1cH. L. REV.
57 (1939).
26 One possible explanation of the view expressed is that Justice Roberts was
swayed by a technical jurisdictional stumbling block which, it was argued, stood in the
way of granting relief under the due process clause. See 39 CoL. L. REv. 1237 at 1242
(1939). It is also interesting to note that somewhat the same views were expressed in
the dictum of Waite, C. J., in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 at 552
(1875), and by Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325
at 337, 41 S. Ct. 125 (1920).
zr See Justice Cardozo's distinction between immunities that are and are not
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" in connection with the due process
clause in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 at 325, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).

